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Abstract :  I use the stochastic econometric cost frontier approach to investigate efficiency
of banks operating in the Third Federal Reserve District, which comprises the eastern two-
thirds of Pennsylvania, the southern half of New Jersey, and Delaware.  The results
indicate that, in general, banks in the district are operating at cost-efficient output levels
and product mixes.  Thus, there appears to be little potential cost savings from banks'
changing their scale or scope of operations.  However, I find a significant level of X-
inefficiency at the banks, indicating potential cost savings from more efficient use of
inputs.  The second part of the article relates the inefficiency measures to several
correlates.EFFICIENCY OF BANKS IN THE THIRD FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
1. Introduction
In recent years banks have had to operate in an increasingly competitive environment. This trend
is expected to continue as interstate banking restrictions fall, the number of nonbank competitors
increases, and competition from foreign banks picks up, partly in response to the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but also in response to the general globalization of markets. How banks
will be affected by the increased competitive pressures depends in part on how efficiently they are run.
This paper uses the stochastic econometric cost frontier approach to study efficiency at banks in
the Third Federal Reserve District, which comprises the eastern two-thirds of Pennsylvania, the southern
half of New Jersey, and Delaware, and is the first to examine efficiency at Third District banks. The
paper looks at scale efficiency—whether banks are operating with the efficient level of outputs; scope
efficiency—whether banks are operations with the efficient mix of outputs; and X-efficiency—whether
banks are using their inputs efficiently. The cost model differs from that used in previous efficiency
studies in that it explicitly accounts for the quality of banks’ assets and the probability of failure, which
can influence banks’ costs in a number of ways. For example, a large proportion of nonperforming loans
may signal that a bank used fewer resources than usual in the initial credit evaluation and monitoring of
its loans. Unless quality and risk are controlled for, one might erroneously conclude that banks scrimping
on the credit evaluation or producing excessively risky loans were efficiently producing output. The
paper also differs from previous efficiency studies as it treats financial capital as an input into the
production process. In addition to providing a cushion against losses, financial capital can be used to
fund loans as a substitute for deposits or other borrowed funds. Previous efficiency studies (except for
Hughes and Mester (1993), which did not study X-efficiency) included neither the price of capital nor
its level. Omitting the price and level of capital makes sense on theoretical grounds only if it is assumed
that financial capital is not used to fund loans, or that its price is the same across all banks or is perfectly
correlated with another input price for all banks and that the banks use the cost-minimizing level of
financial capital, none of which seems plausible. Since there is good reason to believe that cost-
minimization does not fully explain a bank’s capital level—e.g., regulations set minimum capital-to-asset2
ratios, and bank managers may be
is included in the cost function.
1
risk-averse—here, the level of financial capital, instead of its price,
Another difference between this and previous studies is that I report confidence intervals for the
bank-specific measures of inefficiency. Since these bank-specific measures are based on the conditional
distribution of the one-sided part of the composed error term in the stochastic cost function, there is no
good theoretical basis for considering merely the mean or mode of this distribution, as in previous
studies.
2 The confidence intervals give a better indication of the degree of inefficiency at any bank in
the sample.
The second part of the paper attempts to identify some of the characteristics of the efficient banks
in the district. While the results are not intended to imply causation, i.e., that a particular characteristic
causes a bank to be efficient or inefficient, they do indicate where banks might look for clues toward
increasing efficiency. Ultimately, perhaps the best way to determine what banks should do to raise
efficiency is to go on site to the banks identified as most efficient and see what they are doing differently
from banks operating least efficiently.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review of bank
efficiency studies and the methods used for measuring efficiency. Section 3 presents the specification of
the frontier cost function and the stochastic econometric frontier model to be estimated. The inefficiency
measures, including the confidence intervals for the bank-specific measures, are derived. Section 4
discusses the scale and scope economies measures that were estimated. The model specification and data
are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 presents the empirical results and Section 7 concludes.
1See Hughes and Mester (1993) for further discussion.
2T0 my knowledge, only one other paper—Jondrow et al. (1982)—reports confidence bands. Note,
however, that the bands reported here and in Jondrow et al. do not account for the fact that the
parameters of the conditional distribution are estimated. The mean and mode of the conditional
distribution are highly nonlinear functions of the parameters, and while it would be possible to linearize
these functions and obtain an approximate standard error for the estimated mean and mode, it is not clear
that this would be of much value.2. Previous literature and methodologies
Bank efficiency studies can be divided into those that examine scale and scope efficiency alone,
and those that also examine X-efficiency. There have been a very large number of scale and scope
efficiency studies—see Mester (1987), Clark (1988), Evanoff and Israilevich (1991) and Berger and
Humphrey (1992) for summaries of these studies’ results. There has been a much smaller number of
bank X-inefficiency studies—see Berger and Humphrey (1992), Evanoff and Israilevich (1991), and
Mester (1994) for reviews of these studies.
The scale and scope studies estimate an average practice cost function, which relates bank cost
to output levels and input prices. The technique implicitly assumes all banks in the sample are using their
inputs efficiently—in other words, there is no X-inefficiency—and that the banks are using the same
production technology. A two-sided error term is included in the cost function to represent measurement
error or any unpredicted factors that affected a bank’s costs over the period when the data were collected.
In general, most of these studies find that there is little in the way of cost savings to be gained from
banks changing their product levels or mix. Most studies have focused on smaller banks, with assets less
than $1 billion, and have found that scale economies are exhausted between $75 million and $300 million
in assets. Moreover, the measured scale economies for small banks are fairly small: a 1 percent increase
in all output levels typically leads to about a 0.95 percent increase in total cost, which means a 0.05
percent decrease in the average cost of production. A few studies have examined large banks, with assets
over $1 billion. Some found scale economies at very large sized banks, with economies exhausted at
between $2 billion and $10 billion in assets, depending on the study. Still, the measured scale economies
are not very large. Similarly, although there are a few exceptions, most studies found little evidence of
either economies or diseconomies of scope.
Studies concerned with X-efficiency estimate a best practice cost function, which represents the
predicted cost function of banks that are X-efficient, and then measure the degree of inefficiency of banks
in the sample relative to this beSt practice technology. Three common methodologies are data
envelopment analysis (DEA), “thick frontier” analysis, and stochastic econometric cost frontier analysis.4
None of these methodologies is without problems.
3 DEA uses data on costs, outputs, and input prices
for the sample of banks and determines which bank in the sample produces that output combination at
the given input prices at least cost. This defines the “best practice bank” for that output/input prices
combination. A bank’s relative efficiency is measured by the ratio of its own cost to the cost of the “best
practice” bank that faces the sample input prices and produces the same output bundle. A benefit of DEA
is that it is flexible—it does not posit a particular functional form for the best practice banks’ cost
function. But a serious drawback of the approach is that it does not allow for any error in the data.
Banks that have been lucky or whose costs have been under-measured would be labeled as most efficient;
any unfavorable influence beyond a bank’s control would be attributed to inefficiency. Since all data are
subject to measurement error, this approach seems very wanting.
The “thick frontier” approach divides the banks in the sample into four quartiles based on total
cost per unit of assets.
4 By assumption, the estimated cost function for banks in the least average cost
quartile is considered to be the cost frontier—banks in the lowest average cost quartile are assumed to
be the most efficient, and the error term on this estimated function is assumed to represent only random
measurement error and luck instead of differences in efficiency. The estimated cost function for banks
in the highest average cost quartile represents the cost function of banks assumed to be of less than
average efficiency. Again, the error on this estimated function is assumed to represent measurement error
and luck rather than efficiency differences. Differences between the cost functions estimated for banks
in the least average cost quartile and for banks in the highest average cost are assumed to reflect
differences in efficiency alone. But as Berger and Humphrey (1991) themselves point out, these
assumptions about the error term do not hold exactly and are sensitive to whether banks are divided into
quartiles or quantiles or another number of groups. Further, there is the potential for econometric
problems, since the banks are pre-sorted using average cost, which is essentially a dependent variable.
3This discussion of DEA is based on Mester (1994).
4See Berger and Humphrey (1991).5
On the other hand, in addition to being simple to implement, a benefit of the thick-frontier approach is
that it is more flexible regarding the statistical properties of the inefficiency measures than is the
stochastic econometric frontier approach.
In the stochastic econometric frontier approach, a bank is labeled as inefficient if its costs are
.
higher than the costs predicted for an efficient bank producing the same output/input combination and
the difference cannot be explained by statistical noise. The cost frontier is obtained by estimating a cost
function with a composite error term, the sum of a two-sided error and a one-sided error. Since random
fluctuations mean a bank’s cost can be either greater or less than a frontier bank’s costs, it is represented
by an error that can be either positive or negative. But since inefficient banks always have costs that are
greater than the frontier bank’s, X-inefficiency is represented by an error term that can only be positive.
The one-sided error can be used to measure the average level of inefficiency in the sample of banks or
bank-specific inefficiency. Most of the previous work, as does this paper, assumes that the two-sided
error is normally distributed and the one-sided error is half-normally distributed. A drawback of this
approach compared with DEA and thick frontier is that it is less flexible, since assumptions have to be
maintained about the form of the frontier and error terms. However, this seems less serious than DEA’s
assumption of no noise at all and is arguably less ad hoc than thick frontier analysis. Moreover, if panel
data are available, some of the stochastic frontier’s maintained assumptions can be weakened.
5
Stochastic econometric frontier analysis is used here.
The handful of X-inefficiency studies that used either the thick frontier or stochastic econometric
methodologies generally used data from the 1970s and 1980s, and have found X-inefficiency on the order
of about 20 to 30 percent in banking, meaning that the average bank could produce a cost savings of
about 20 to 30 percent if it eliminated X-inefficiency. Since DEA attributes statistical noise to
inefficiency, these studies have found X-inefficiencies on the order of 20 to 50 percent. These results
5See Schmidt and Sickles (1984). Unfortunately, since it is important that the banks in the sample
be operating with the same production technology, and since branching restrictions have only recently
been eliminated in Pennsylvania—branching throughout the state became totally unrestricted only on
March 4, 1990—panel data techniques were not available here.6
indicate there is substantial room for improvement at U.S. banks and that elimination of X-inefficiency
could produce larger cost savings than if banks change the scale or scope of their operations.
3. Stochastic econometric cost frontier model and inefficiency measures
The stochastic econometric frontier model posits that a bank’s observed cost will deviate from
the cost frontier because of random noise, vi, and possible inefficiency, ui. That is, for N firms in the
sample,
(1)
where Ci  is observed cost of bank i, yi is the vector of output levels for bank i, wi is the vector of input
prices for bank i, qi is a vector of variables characterizing the quality of bank i’s output, ki is the level
of financial capital at bank i, B is a vector of parameters, ln C(yi,wi,qi,ki;B) is the predicted log cost
function of a cost-minimizing bank operating at (yi,wi,qi,ki), vi is a two-sided error term representing the
statistical noise, and ui is a one-sided error term representing inefficiency. The vi are assumed to be
independently and identically distributed, and the ui are assumed to be distributed independently of the
half normally distributed, i.e., the ui  are the absolute values of a variable that is normally distributed with
is
With these distributional assumptions, the log-likelihood function of the model
(2)
cumulative distribution function. The model can be estimated using maximum likelihood techniques.
Once the model is estimated, inefficiency measures are calculated using the residuals. First, the
6Other distributions have also been used. For example, Stevenson (1980) used the normal-truncated
I am currently extending this research to check the robustness of my results for different distributions of
the error terms.7
is the estimated residual for firm i, since u is independent of v and E(v)=0. The mean inefficiency is
Since the distribution of the maximum likelihood estimates is known, one can
Bank-level measures of inefficiency are usually given by the mean and mode of the conditional
For the normal-half normal stochastic model, the conditional distribution of
at zero is
(3)
The mean and the mode of this conditional distribution are
(4)
7This can be seen by adapting for the cost function the equation for the production function derived
in Jondrow et al. (1982).8
is typically not done.
(6)
(7)
4. Scale and within-sample scope economies
The scale economies measures consider the effect on cost of a proportional variation in the levels
of all ouputs, financial capital, and quality. That is, since bank default risk is measured by the level
of financial capital relative to bank size and quality is measured by the level of nonperforming loans
relative to bank size, the measure of scale economies used here considers the effect of a scaled variation9




and our measure of scale economies is
SCL < 1 implies multiproduct economies of scale; SCL > 1 implies multiproduct diseconomies of scale;10
and SCL = 1 implies constant returns to scale.
8
Economies of scope exist between outputs when the cost of producing them together in a single
firm is less than the cost of producing them in different firms. Here I estimate within-sample economies
of scope. In the case of three outputs (which will be used below), the degree of within-sample global
sample.
9  Within-sample economies of scope is a better measure than the conventional scope economies
measure because it avoids having to extrapolate outside of the sample. That is, the conventional measure
involves evaluating the cost function at zero levels of the outputs even when no bank in the sample is
operating at a zero level of any output. The within-sample measure instead evaluates the cost function
at the minimum levels of the outputs in the sample, and measures the percentage increase in cost of
dividing up the outputs into relatively specialized banks, but none more specialized than the most
specialized bank in the sample.
10 In addition, since some cost functions, like the translog, imply cost
is zero if any output level is zero, conventional scope economies cannot be measured for these cost
functions, while within-sample scope economies can be.
11
5. The model specification and data
translog specification
8Note that this measure is the reciprocal of the measure used in Hughes and Mester (1993).
specialized firms equals y, the point at which scope economies are being evaluated. For n outputs, one
10See Mester (1991) and Mester (1992) for more discussion.
11One difficulty in interpreting even the within-sample measures of scope economies is that they are
evaluated at a fixed level of financial capital, k, and quality, q. Hence, risk and quality are not held
constant across the specialized banks.(11)
C = total cost
yi = quantity of output i
wj
= price of input j
k = financial capital
q = quality measure.
I used
each quarter.
1991-92 data from the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income that banks must file
Since I wanted to estimate the cost frontier of standard commercial banks that are using
the same production technology, some banks were omitted from the sample.
12 The sample of 214
12Since efficiency is measured relative to the cost frontier, it is important that all banks in the sample
have access to the same frontier; hence, they should be using the same technology. (Whether one
technology is better than another is a separate issue.) One advantage to restricting the sample to the
Third District rather than using a U.S. sample is that banks in the Third District are likely to have more
in common with each other, thus making it more likely they are using the same production technology.
It should be remembered that the results presented below apply only to the 1992 period. Since branching12
banks included all the banks in the Third Federal Reserve District except for the special purpose banks
in Delaware (legislated under the Financial Center Development Act and the Consumer Credit Bank Act),
de novo banks (i.e., banks less than five years old as of December 1992, which have start-up costs that
more mature banks do not have), banks that were involved in a merger in 1992, and three very large
banks (which very likely use different production techniques than the other banks).
13 (None of the
banks in the sample had changed
membership status over 1991-92.)
holding company
The median asset
status, charter type, or Federal Reserve System
size of banks included was $144 million, and the
average asset size was $325 million.
There continues to be some debate about what constitutes the outputs and inputs of a financial
institution. I used the intermediation approach here, which views the institution as using labor, physical
capital, and deposits to produce earning assets [see Sealey and Lindley (1977)]; this is the approach most
commonly used in the conventional cost function literature.
14 Three outputs were included: y1 = real
estate loans, y2 = commercial and industrial loans, lease financing receivables, agricultural loans, loans
to depository institutions, acceptances of other banks, loans to foreign governments, obligations of states
restrictions have only recently been eliminated in Pennsylvania—branching throughout the state became
totally unrestricted only on March 4, 1990—more years of data were not included in the study.
13If the banks in the District are ordered by asset size, the sizes grow relatively smoothly from about
$13 million to about $3.8 billion; then there is a jump to $7.8 billion, then to $9.3 billion, and then to
$16 billion. Since there is empirical evidence that very large banks use a different production technology
than other banks (e.g., findings of scale economies differ for smaller and large banks), and large banks
also produce different outputs from small banks (e.g., they have more off-balance sheet business), these
three largest banks were not included in the sample. Also, a few banks were excluded because of
misreported data.
14Different approaches to measuring output have generally led to similar conclusions concerning the
cost structures of financial firms. For example, Mester (1992) found that including transactions deposits
as an output did not change any of the conclusions concerning production economies for large banks.
Moreover, Hughes and Mester (1993) developed a test to determine whether deposits are outputs or
inputs. A variable cost (VC) function in which insured and uninsured deposits are entered in levels is
estimated. If the derivative of VC with respect to insured deposits is positive, then insured deposits are
an output; if the derivative is negative, then insured deposits are an input. The same test can be applied
for uninsured deposits. For their sample, Hughes and Mester (1993) found that both types of deposits
were inputs.13
and political subdivisions, and other loans, and y3 = loans to individuals. Each of these was measured
by the average dollar volume that the bank held in 1992 (i.e., the difference between the volumes in
December 1992 and December 1991). These three outputs account for nearly all of a bank’s non-
securities earning assets. The average volume of each of these three outputs at banks in the sample was
about $120 million, $52 million, and $31 million, respectively. Thus, about 60 percent of the average
bank’s loan portfolio is in real estate, about 25 percent is business loans, and the rest is loans to
individuals.
The inputs (whose prices are used to estimate the cost frontier) included labor, physical capital,
and borrowed money (including deposits, federal funds, and other borrowed money) used to fund the
outputs. The wage rate w1 was proxied by [salaries and benefits expenses in 1992/number of full-time
equivalent employees at year end 1992]. The unit price of physical capital, w2, was constructed as the
[premises and fixed assets (net of rental income) expenses in 1992/average value of premises and fixed
assets in 1992]. The borrowed money price, w3, was constructed as (interest expense on deposits, net
of service charges + interest expense of fed funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to
repurchase + interest on demand notes issued to the U.S. Treasury and on other borrowed money +
interest on subordinated notes and debentures in 1992)/average dollar volume of these types of funds in
1992. Total costs, C, were labor, premises, and fixed assets expense, and (interest expense on deposits,
net of service charges + interest expense of fed funds purchased and securities sold under agreements
to repurchase + interest on demand notes issued to the U.S. Treasury and on other borrowed money +
interest on subordinated notes and debentures in 1992)x(real estate loans, commercial and industrial
loans, lease financing receivables, agricultural loans, loans to depository institutions, acceptances of other
banks, loans to foreign governments, obligations of states and political subdivisions, other loans, and
loans to individuals/total earning assets).
15 To account for the quality of the banks’ outputs and bank
15As in Hunter, Timme, and Yang (1990), Mester (1992), and Hughes and Mester (1993), the interest
expense was weighted by total output/total earning assets to reflect the interest expense that can be
allocated to the bank’s loan output.14
risk (and so to avoid labeling as efficient banks that are not
by q = average volume of nonperforming loans in 1992,
monitoring their loans), quality was proxied
and financial capital was measured as k =
average volume of equity capital in 1992, and both were included as arguments in the cost function. The
volume of nonperforming loans relative to the level of bank output is inversely related to quality: the
higher the bank’s nonperforming loans for a given volume of loans, the less resources the bank likely
spent on monitoring its loan portfolio.
16 The higher the bank’s level of financial capital relative to the
level of output, the lower the bank’s probability of failure and so the bank’s interest costs. Financial
capital is also included because capital can be used as a funding source for loans. Table 1 summarizes
the data (included are some variables not yet discussed that will be used in Section 6).
6. Empirical results
6.1 Scale economies and within-sample scope economies
Table 2 reports the parameter estimates. Table 3 reports measures of scale economies and
within-sample scope economies. The measures are based on the estimated cost frontier and so indicate
whether a bank that was minimizing the cost of producing a particular output bundle could lower costs
proportionately by choosing another level of output or by changing its output mix—they are for the
efficient banks only. In contrast, in the conventional nonfrontier cost function methodology, the scale
and scope measures apply to all firms in the sample and might be distorted if they are correlated with
efficiency. The scale and scope measures are evaluated at the mean output, input price levels, quality,
and financial capital levels over the entire sample or for the size quartiles given.
The estimated average cost frontier for Third District banks seems to be quite flat. The efficient
bank producing the average level of each output and facing the average input prices is producing with
constant returns to scale—the point estimate of SCL is 0.9525 with standard error 0.02019, and so is
insignificantly different from one. Thus, a 1 percent increase in the level of all outputs, holding risk and
l6Nonperforming loans are loans that are 30 or more days past due but still accruing interest plus
loans that are not accruing interest. While the macroeconomy can affect nonperforming loans, its effect
is felt equally across banks. It is the differences in nonperforming loans across banks that capture
differences in quality across banks.15
the quality of the output constant, would lead to about a 1 percent increase in costs. Moreover, over the
entire size range of banks operating in the district, efficient banks are operating with constant returns to
scale. As shown in Table 3, the point estimates of SCL for the average efficient bank in each of the four
asset size quartiles in the sample are insignificantly different from one. (Although the point estimates
suggest decreasing average costs, a flat average cost curve cannot be ruled out statistically.) Therefore,
there do not seem to be many cost efficiency gains to be made from Third District banks’ changing their
sizes, and these results are much like those obtained in studies using U.S. samples.
The within-sample scope economies measures reported in Table 3 indicate there is no evidence
of either scope economies or diseconomies at the average efficient bank in the Third District, nor at banks
in different size categories, since the measures are statistically insignificant from zero. Thus, there do
not appear to be many cost efficiency gains to be made by a bank’s changing its loan mix (which for the
typical bank in the sample is weighted toward real estate loans). While the scope measures suggest there
is no cost justification for joint production, there could be revenue (i.e., demand-side) benefits, which
would not be captured in the scope measures.
6.2 Inefficiency
Table 4 reports estimates of the inefficiency measures discussed in Section 3. Summary measures
As shown in Table 4, average X-inefficiency at banks in the Third District is on the order of 6
to 9 percent. That is, given its particular output level and mix, if the average bank were to use its inputs16
as efficiently as possible, it could reduce its production cost by roughly 6 to 9 percent. The average
annual cost of output production at banks in the sample was about $12 million, so a 6 percent reduction
in cost could potentially add about $720,000 to bank profits, which, given the average bank’s size of $325
million in assets, constitutes a potential increase of 0.2 percent in before-tax return on assets, or about
0.15 percent in after-tax ROA. This is not a trivial amount, as the average bank in the District had an
after-tax ROA of 1 percent in 1992. In competitive markets not all of this gain would be retained by the
bank—the savings would be passed on to customers in the form of lower loan rates and higher deposit
rates. In any case, increased efficiency would increase welfare.
Of course, not all banks are the “average” bank. Figure 1 gives the frequency distribution of the
range, some banks are quite efficient but others show a good deal of inefficiency. According to the point
= 0.07114.
17 Thus, for this observation, the 90 percent
[0.0008592, 0.09719]. These confidence intervals show that the most efficient bank in the sample could
still be operating with a moderately large level of inefficiency. The most inefficient bank in the sample
percent confidence interval is [0.09090, 0.3690]. These confidence intervals are quite wide; nevertheless,
they do indicate that there is a statistically significant (at the 10 percent level) difference between
inefficiency at the least and most inefficient banks (since the 90 percent confidence intervals do not
intersect for these two banks).
19
bank is expected to lie precisely on the estimated cost frontier.
l9The confidence intervals for all other observations in the sample are available from the author,17
When compared with results of other studies using U.S. samples that found average X-
inefficiency on the order of 20 to 30 percent, Third District banks seem to be outperforming U.S. banks
on average. It is difficult to determine whether this is a statistically significant difference, however. It
. might just reflect that this study is based on more recent data, or it might be because banks in the U.S.
samples are more diverse, making efficiency measurement more difficult.
20 In any case, as with U.S.
banks in general, it appears that many Third District banks have room for improvement.
6.3 Correlates with inefficiency
It remains to discuss the characteristics of inefficient banks in the Third District. I calculated
banks in the sample differed.
21 (Of course, a relationship need not imply causality. That is, I am not
saying these characteristics cause inefficiency, only that they seem to be more prevalent in inefficient
banks.
22)
a linear regression model, as in Mester (1993). The general form of this regression equation is
(12)
20It might also be because Third District banks use a different production technology than other U.S.
banks. Another possibility is that here I controlled for differences in bank risk and output quality, while
other studies did not. This does not appear to be a source of the difference, since re-estimating my model
omitting financial capital and quality still yields relatively low X-inefficiency estimates.
21Saxonhouse’s (1976) method for treating heteroskedasticity that can arise when estimated parameters
are used as dependent variables was not applicable here, since the model I estimated is nonlinear. Note
produce results similar to the ones reported below.
22Another reason to interpret the results as providing information on correlation only instead of
causality is that there may be some endogeneity, since the characteristics are for the same period as the
inefficiency measures. Causality may run from inefficiency to the characteristics instead of the other way
around. For example, inefficient firms may choose to invest in real estate rather than investing in real
estate leading to inefficiency.18
normally distributed error term. I used nonlinear OLS to estimate equation (12).
23
The 15 independent variables included are:
24 CONST = constant term, YEAR = year the
bank opened, CHAR = 1 if the bank is state-chartered and 0 if it is federally chartered, HOLD = 1 if
the bank is a member of a holding company and 0 otherwise, FR = 1 if the bank is a member of the
Federal Reserve System and 0 otherwise, BRANCH = number of bank offices (at the end of 1992), NJ
= 1 if the bank’s headquarters is located in New Jersey and 0 otherwise, DEL = 1 if the bank’s
headquarters is located in Delaware and 0 otherwise, TOTA = total assets (measured in billions of
dollars), TQCA = total qualifying capital (i.e., capital that is included in Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital)/total
assets, ROA = net income/total assets, UDEP = uninsured deposits/total deposits, LCLDTL =
construction and land development loans/total loans, RETL = real estate loans/total loans, and INTL
= loans to individuals/total loans.
YEAR is included to see if the bank’s age is related to its degree of inefficiency; CHAR, HOLD,
FR, and BRANCH are included to account for organizational and regulatory structure; NJ and DEL are
included to see if inefficiency differs by bank location within the district; TOTA controls for the overall
size of the bank; TQCA measures capital adequacy (moral hazard theory suggests that TQCA should be
inversely related to inefficiency); ROA is a measure of performance (higher efficiency is expected to be
correlated with better performance); UDEP measures reliance on noncore deposits (uninsured depositors
might impose market discipline on bank managers, but banks that are relying on these deposits rather than
core deposits might be in bad shape); and LCLDTL, RETL, and INTL account for portfolio mix.
As shown in Table 5, the simple correlation, which does not hold constant the other
characteristics, and the regression results, which do hold constant other characteristics of the bank,
indicate that inefficient banks in the District tend to be younger than more efficient banks. This might
results as the ones reported below.
24All are measured as of year-end 1992.19
be evidence that banking involves “learning by doing,” or it might indicate that more efficient banks are
more likely to survive. (Recall that the de novo banks were not included in the sample, so the result
probably doesn’t merely reflect younger banks’ higher start-up costs, for example, the costs of
establishing customer relationships.)
Even though the point estimates in Table 5 show differences in inefficiency among banks in the
three states, once other bank characteristics are controlled for, there is no statistically significant
difference in inefficiency across the states.
25 That is, the coefficients on NJ and DE are insignificantly
different from zero, which indicates that, holding other factors constant, there is no significant difference
in inefficiency between New Jersey banks and Pennsylvania banks or between Delaware and Pennsylvania
banks. Similarly, the coefficients on NJ and DE are not significantly different from one another,
suggesting that, holding other factors constant, there is no significant difference in inefficiency between
New Jersey banks and Delaware banks. (The test statistic is the difference in coefficients on NJ and DE;
its value is 0.3536 with standard error 0.2257.)
Similarly, there is no evidence that larger banks are more or less X-efficient than smaller banks,
since the coefficient on TOTA is insignificantly different from zero. This result, coupled with our results
on scale economies, suggests that banks of all sizes in our District can be equally competitive when it
comes to cost efficiency. Also, there is no evidence that greater reliance on uninsured deposits is
correlated with greater inefficiency, since the Coefficient on UDEP
This result differs from Mester (1993) who found that reliance on
mutual S&Ls was correlated with greater inefficiency.
There are a few other statistically significant relationships,
to have a higher percentage of their loans in construction and
is insignificantly different from zero.
uninsured deposits at both stock and
For example, inefficient banks tend
land development and in loans to
individuals, since the coefficients on LCLDTL and INTL are significantly positive (at the 5 percent and
25The simple correlation coefficient indicates that being located in New Jersey is significantly related
to being inefficient, but this is because the New Jersey banks in the sample tend to have lower capital
than Pennsylvania and Delaware banks in the sample. Once capital is controlled for (as in the
regression), being located in New Jersey is not significantly related to inefficiency.20
10 percent levels of significance, respectively). National banks appear to be less efficient than state banks
that are members of the Federal Reserve System but seem to have the same level of efficiency as state
nonmember banks.
26 That is, the coefficients on FR and CHART are significantly less than zero (at
the 10 percent and 5 percent levels of significance, respectively), but they are not significantly different
from one another. (The difference in the coefficients is -0.04157 with standard error 0.06827.)
Among the statistically significant relationships, one of the more interesting is the negative
relationship between inefficiency and the capital-asset ratio—the coefficient on TQCA is significantly
interpreted as saying that if a bank increases its capital-asset ratio then its efficiency will increase. But
it may be an indication that higher capital ratios may prevent moral hazard. As is often cited in
discussions of the thrift crisis, as an institution’s capital level decreases it has an increasing incentive to
take on excessive risk, since it keeps any upside gain and loses only the amount of capital it has invested
in the bank if the risk does not pay off. Similarly, the managers of banks with lower capital levels might
have more of an incentive to engage in perk-taking, and they face less shareholder scrutiny than banks
with higher capital ratios. The capital-asset ratio might also be significantly related to inefficiency
because inefficient banks have lower profits, which might lead to lower
future.
27 Mester (1993) also found that for both stock and mutual S&Ls,
were correlated with greater efficiency.
capital-asset ratios in the
higher capital-asset ratios
26Note, all nationally chartered banks are Fed member banks, but their primary regulator is the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, not the Fed.
27But this is probably not the entire reason, since the relationship between capital-assets and
inefficiency holds even when return-on-assets is held constant—that is, the coefficient on TQCA is
significant in the regression, which includes ROA as an independent variable—and while return-on-assets
and capital-assets are significantly correlated, they are not collinear—their correlation coefficient is
0.4538.21
7. Conclusions
This paper uses the stochastic econometric cost frontier approach to investigate efficiency of banks
operating in the Third Federal Reserve District using 1991-92 data. I modify the cost frontier so that
both bank default risk and output quality can be held constant when comparing the efficiency of the
banks. I present estimates of scale economies and within-sample scope economies for banks operating
on the cost frontier. I also present estimates of the average X-inefficiency in the sample and bank-specific
measures of X-inefficiency. In addition, I present the 90 percent and 95 percent confidence intervals for
the most and least X-efficient banks in the sample. These show that there is a significant (at the 10
percent level) difference between X-efficiency at these banks. The second part of the paper relates the
bank-specific inefficiency measures to several correlates.
The study indicates that banks in the Third District appear to be operating at cost-efficient output
sizes and product mixes, but there appears to be a significant level of X-inefficiency at the banks. In
terms of coping with the increased competitive pressures, inefficient banks in the Third District have
more to fear from banks that are efficient producers than from banks that are producing a particular
output volume or product mix. There is less to be gained in terms of cost savings from changing output
size or mix than from using inputs more cost effectively. Case studies that focus on the more efficient
banks in the District might shed light on how greater efficiency can be achieved. Theoretical advances
may enable us to better identify the sources of the inefficiencies and verify
inefficiency are true differences and do not result just from omitting
misspecifying the cost function.
that measured differences in
factors that affect cost or22
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Table 3. Scale Economies and Within-Sample Scope Economies’
*Statistics are calculated at the mean values of outputs, input prices, quality, and financial capital
levels for the overall sample in column 1 and for the size categories specified in columns 2-5.
Approximate standard errors in parentheses.
the average input prices, financial capital, and quality; yi is the volume of output i; k is the level of
financial capital; and q is quality, proxied by the volume of non-performing loans. SCL < 1 implies
increasing returns to scale; SCL > 1 implies decreasing returns to scale; SCL = 1 implies constant
returns to scale.
amount of output i produced by any bank in the sample; and C(•) is the predicted cost of producing an
output bundle at the average input prices, financial capital, and quality. WSCOPE > 0 implies
economies of scope; WSCOPE < 0 implies diseconomies of scope.
cSignificantly different from zero but insignificantly different from one at the 5 percent level, two-
tailed test.
dInsignificantly different from zero at the 5 percent level, two-tailed test.